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Pretrial attitudes (attitudes held preceding any case-specific information) towards the insanity 
defense are known to influence jurors’ decision-making about a case. However, the impact of 
pre-trial attitude on decisions across different types of evidence was an open question that the 
present study addressed. Through Amazon Mechanical Turk, participants indicated their pretrial 
support for the insanity defense. Participants served as mock jurors and rated the likelihood of 
giving the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) as well as perceived responsibility 
for the defendant’s actions; they gave these ratings after introducing seven different pieces of 
evidence (baseline case vignette, mother hospitalized for schizophrenia, defendant abused as 
child, defendant testimony to delusions, psychological evaluation diagnosing defendant with 
schizophrenia, comorbid substance abuse, brain scans supporting schizophrenia diagnosis). 
Pretrial attitudes had a significant effect on mock jurors’ ratings, with those in the low-support 
group being significantly less likely than the those with higher support to give the defendant 
NGRI. There was also a significant interaction between attitude groups and type of evidence. 
Both the effect of attitude group and the interaction between evidence type and attitude group 
were significant for responsibility ratings as well. The results of this study have important 
implications for insanity defense trials, and highlight the importance of how pretrial attitudes and 
different types of evidence, as well as how pretrial attitudes interact with types of evidence, 
influence the likelihood of a mock juror giving a defendant NGRI. 
 
 Key words: Not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), insanity defense, legal insanity, fair 
trial, legal psychology, pretrial attitudes, juror decision-making, evidence type 
PRETRIAL	  ATTITUDES’	  INFLUENCE	  ON	  JUROR	  DECISIONS	  	  
3	  
	  
Pretrial Attitudes and How They Influence Decision-Making in Insanity Defense Cases 
 
The sixth amendment guarantees individuals the right to a fair trial, heard by an impartial 
jury. An impartial jury requires that jurors set aside any biases they might have so that they can 
make sentencing decisions based on the evidence and circumstances of the case at hand. 
However, it turns out that even when jurors are explicitly asked to set aside case-relevant biases, 
their sentencing decisions still reflect their biases (Kardis, 2015). Biases are particularly 
problematic in cases involving an insanity plea because insanity pleas are viewed in a 
particularly negative light by many potential jurors.  The current study examines the impact that 
pre-trial beliefs regarding the insanity plea have on potential jurors’ sentencing decisions in 
insanity defense cases. 
For insanity defense cases, defendants are held to legal standards of insanity. The legal 
standard for insanity is outlined by two rules: The McNaughton rule and the Durham rule. The 
McNaughton rule states that an individual who was unable to appreciate the criminality of their 
actions and was unable to determine right from wrong at the time of committing the crime is not 
guilty by reason of insanity. The Durham rule covers individuals who might have been able to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions, but acted on an irritable impulse. Using these rules 
to define legal insanity, it is up to the jury to decide if the defendant qualifies as legally insane 
and can be acquitted and granted not guilty by reason of insanity based on the legal standards for 
insanity and the presented case evidence. 
Jurors are supposed to rely solely on case evidence and legal insanity standards when 
making sentencing decisions and determining criminal insanity, however, the criminally insane 
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are a stigmatized population and many people to hold negative views towards legal insanity and 
insanity pleas because they see them as dangerous and unpredictable (Axer, Beckett, Jones 
2010). Axer et al. wrote a paper reflecting on a meeting of the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board in which they collected statements regarding individuals who are labeled as criminally 
insane. In reviewing the statements, they found that over one quarter (27%) of the statements 
reflected negative emotions towards the criminally insane. Upon further evaluating these 
statements, they primarily reflected the fear of unpredictable and random violence (Axer et al., 
2010). If this fear of violence and negative view of the insanity defense is pervasive so that over 
a quarter of potential jurors hold these views, it is important to consider if these views can be set 
aside when making sentencing decisions, since those decisions should be made based on case 
evidence and legal standards alone. 
Pervasive negative attitudes towards the criminally insane and the insanity defense have 
been seen to significantly influence both how jurors interpret case information, as well as their 
verdict decisions. Skeem and Golding (2001) addressed the question of whether jurors are truly 
able to make decisions only based on case evidence and legal standards, when they hear an 
insanity defense case. They found that jurors have difficulties setting aside their personal 
attitudes towards the insanity defense. Further, they revealed that these attitudes influence both 
how jurors interpret case information as well as verdict decisions. In their study, Skeem and 
Golding (2001) first established mock jurors’ common conceptions of an individual who would 
not be responsible for their criminal actions due to mental illness. These conceptions of criminal 
insanity were organized into common prototypes, which represent a “typical” member of a 
category (in this case the criminally insane). The prototypes reflected individual differences in 
conceptions of the criminally insane and had different central traits according to mock jurors’ 
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different conceptions of an individual who should not be held criminally responsible for their 
actions on account of mental illness. The main porotypes groupings that were identified by 
Skeem and Golding (2001, p. 561), “emphasize severe mental disability, ‘moral insanity,’ and 
mental state at the time of the offense.” While the mental state of the defendant at the time of the 
crime may align with legal definitions for insanity to some extent, these main prototype 
groupings found in their study differ from legal conceptions of insanity. This difference between 
legal concepts of insanity and the prototypes jurors tend to hold can influences how jurors 
interpret case information regarding the sanity of the defendant if they are relying on their 
personal prototypes of insanity as opposed to legal definitions of insanity. 
Further, Skeem and Golding (2001) also looked at the idea that the insanity defense 
carries prevalent negative attitudes that are “prevalent, change resistant, and highly influential on 
jurors’ verdicts,” (Skeem and Golding, 2001, 563) to see what effect these attitudes have on juror 
sentencing decisions. In this study, Skeem and Golding showed that jurors have difficulty setting 
aside their biases even when specifically asked to do so by a judge. Individuals have subjective, 
complex prototypes of insanity which differ person to person and don’t overlap well with legal 
definitions of insanity or psychiatric diagnosis (Skeem and Golding, 2001). They were able to 
conclude with this that jurors’ interpretation of case evidence and how they make decisions 
regarding the case are more influenced by the prototypes the jurors came to the case with rather 
than manipulations within the case. If they are basing decision-making on their preexisting 
prototypes as opposed to legal definitions of insanity, then jurors are in fact not coming in as 
unbiased and objective, as the legal system presumes, and their verdict decisions are subject to 
the biases rooted in each juror’s prototype of insanity. 
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The negative views and constructs that some potential jurors hold towards the insanity 
defense have a larger influence on juror decision-making when the jurors have less information 
about a case (Kardis, 2015). When less information is provided, or when the information is 
ambiguous, jurors will automatically (and perhaps unknowingly) rely on their constructs of 
insanity, or their heuristics and other cognitive shortcuts. So, if jurors have these biases, and it 
has been found that people have difficulties setting them aside when making sentencing 
decisions, then it is imperative to consider the effect this has in insanity defense cases where over 
one quarter of potential jurors already hold negative views towards the insanity defense. 
In addition to the amount of information influencing a tendency to rely on pre-existing 
attitudes, Kleider et al (2012) showed that cognitive capacity made jurors more reliant on racial 
stereotypes in insanity defense cases. Their findings were in line with a study conducted by 
Kardis (2015), showing that jurors would have to have excess cognitive capacity in order to 
consciously suppress reliance on stereotypes. The automatic reliance on stereotypes is due to the 
heuristic nature of stereotypes, meaning that they act as a cognitive shortcut to reduce the amount 
of cognitive energy used (Kleider et al, 2012). Kleider et al determined that lower cognitive 
capacity or ambiguous details will lead to more reliance on personal experience and cognitive 
shortcuts, and thus more reliance on stereotypes. 
In the present study, I examined changes in mock jurors’ decision-making after the 
introduction of new case evidence.  First, I ascertained mock jurors’ pre-trial attitudes towards 
legal insanity and the insanity defense. Following this, the participants were presented with a 
case vignette in which the defendant was employing the insanity defense. The participants were 
asked to rate the likelihood they would rate the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, as well 
as how responsible they believe the defendant was for their actions. Each participant was 
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subsequently given six more pieces of information about the defendant, after each of which they 
are again asked to rate the likelihood of finding the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity 
and to rate the responsibility of the defendant. The goal of this study is to look at the influence of 
mock jurors’ pretrial attitudes on sentencing decisions across different types of evidence. More 
specifically to see how different types of added evidence interact with pretrial attitudes in 
relation to mock jurors’ likelihood of giving a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, as well 
as the perceived responsibility for committing manslaughter.  
The first piece of addition information regarded family history of mental illness, in which 
the defendant’s mother had a history of a mental disorder, in this case schizophrenia. Greenwood 
et al (2016) reinforced the notion that schizophrenia is one of the more highly heritable mental 
illnesses, with the heritability being between 45%-50%. Given this heritability, the defendant has 
a higher chance of developing schizophrenia than another individual chosen at random, which 
could influence how in control of his actions the defendant may seem to jurors, potentially 
further fitting their subjective prototypes of insanity (or not). 
Next it was revealed that the defendant suffered physical abuse growing up. As Curran et 
al. (2016) found through their study on childhood adversity’s effect of mental illness, increased 
experience of childhood adversities, including child abuse, are highly correlated with increased 
degree of psychopathology as adults. This, especially combined with the heritability of 
schizophrenia from his mother, may further contribute to matching or not matching the jurors’ 
prototypes of insanity. 
Following this, it was revealed that the defendant testified to experiencing hallucinations 
and delusions. This testimony was subjective and offered by the defendant who is pleading 
insanity, and may be interpreted differently by jurors depending on their personal conceptions of 
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criminal insanity. This subjective testimony was followed by a psychological evaluation that 
establishes the defendant himself suffers from schizophrenia. It has been determined that those 
who have an official psychiatric diagnosis are substantially more likely to be found not guilty by 
reason of insanity as compared to those who simply testify to having symptoms and don’t have a 
psychological evaluation (Gulayets 182). 
It was further added that the defendant also has comorbid substance abuse; and as 
Mossière and Maeder (2016) found, those with substance abuse problems have been evaluated 
most harshly by jurors in their verdict decisions. 
Finally, the last piece of evidence that was presented was brain scans showing brain 
abnormalities correlated with schizophrenia. Specifically, abnormalities in the temporal lobe 
have been associated with schizophrenia (Gurley and Marcus, 2008). According to Gurley and 
Marcus (2008), neurobiological evidence such as brain scans are growing in prevalence, and are 
highly effective support for an insanity plea, particularly when it serves to support other 
psychological evidence for mental disorder.  In cases where it does not support other 
psychological evidence for insanity, it can be dismissed before reaching court based on being 
only correlational (not causal) evidence for mental illness. The goal of the present research is to 
look at how being gradually presented with additional pieces of information will influence 
jurors’ sentencing decisions. Further, I was interested in seeing how the attitudes that individuals 
hold prior to receiving any case information influence decisions regarding likelihood of giving a 
defendant not guilty by reason of insanity as well as perceived responsibility for the defendant’s 
actions. It is also of interest to see how different attitudes towards the insanity defense influence 
individual’s ratings across different pieces of case evidence. 
 







There were 651 participants who filled out the survey for this study. Of these participants, 
93 failed to complete the survey. Additionally, 68 participants incorrectly answered the criterion 
for inclusion question. Thus, 490 participants’ responses were retained for analyses. Participants 
were paid $0.25 for taking the survey. The average age of participants in this study is 34 years 
old, with a range from 18 to 69.  The distribution of self-reported race of the participants is 
56.7% European American, 6.1% African American, 5.7% Latin American/Hispanic, 18.6% 
Asian American, and 12.9% selected “Other”. Table 1 shows the gender, race, age, and political 
affiliation of the participants who were included in the analyses in the groupings used for 
analyses. 
Materials and Procedure 
The experiment was conducted online using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. First, 
participants were told they the survey would last about 15 min, and that they would receive $0.25 
for completing it. Next, they are asked to confirm that they were over 18 years of age and to give 
consent to participating in the research. 
Following this, they are asked to respond with their level of agreement on a 10-question 
survey that assessed their pretrial attitudes towards the insanity defense and insanity pleas. These 
questions were taken based on Skeem, Louden, and Evans (2004) study through which the 
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developed and refined a scale to measure venirepersons’ (potential jurors) attitudes towards the 
insanity defense. From this scale, 10 items were selected in order to measure participants’ views 
towards the insanity defense and liability of the defendant. These were also selected so that they 
were balanced with half positive (e.g. “It is wrong to punish someone for an act they commit 
because of any uncontrollable illness, whether it be epilepsy or mental illness”) and half negative 
(e.g. “Perfectly sane killers can get away with their crimes by hiring high-priced lawyers and 
experts who misuse the insanity defense.”) views. Participants responded with their level of 
agreement to each of the 10 questions on a 5-point Likert-type scale, from Strongly Disagree to 
Strongly Agree.  Cronbach’s Alpha was calculated to measure internal reliability for the pretrial 
attitude scale, it was .788. 
After measuring participants’ pretrial attitudes, the participants read a case vignette in 
which the defendant murdered a stranger and was being tried for manslaughter.  The case 
included the information that the defendant was pleading insanity (Appendix A contains the case 
description). After reading the case, participants rated how likely they were to acquit the 
defendant by giving them not guilty by reason of insanity with the following categories: 
Extremely Unlikely, Somewhat Unlikely, Neither Likely nor Unlikely, Somewhat Likely, and 
Extremely Likely. They also rated perceived responsibility for his actions on two scales with the 
following categories: Extremely Not Responsible, Somewhat Not Responsible, Neither 
Responsible nor Not Responsible, Somewhat Responsible, and Extremely Responsible. The 
participants then read six additional pieces of information and the same rating questions for not 
guilty by reason of insanity and perceived responsibility after each additional piece of 
information. The additional information was presented one piece at a time in the following order: 
the defendant’s mother had been hospitalized for schizophrenia, the defendant had a history of 
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abuse, the defendant testified that he experienced delusions, a psychological evaluation showed 
that the defendant has schizophrenia, the defendant experienced problems with substance abuse, 
and lastly, brain scans that supported a diagnosis of schizophrenia were provided at trial. 
Following each of the pieces of case information being presented and participants giving 
both not guilty by reason of insanity and perceived responsibility ratings after being presented 
with all pieces of evidence, they are asked to picture both the defendant and the victim, and then 
report the race of each of them. The races of the defendant and victim were not mentioned in the 
survey, since the survey was not intending to measure racial influences in insanity defense 
sentencing decisions. This being said, when participants reported the race that they pictured the 
defendant and victim, the race of the victim was reported as non-white by 33.9% of the 
participants and as white by 66.1% of participants. This did not vary as a function of the 
participant’s race. Additionally, the race of the defendant was reported as non-white by 16.5% of 
participants, and as white by 83.5% of participants. This also does not appear to vary as a 
function of the participant’s race, however, non-European Americans were somewhat more 
likely (86.7% said he was white) than European Americans (80.9% said he was white) to say that 
the defendant was white.  
Next, participants were asked to self-report demographic information. They were asked 
to report gender (Male, Female, Other) and race (European American, African American, Latin 
American/Hispanic, Asian American, Other). Additionally, they were asked to report their 
political orientation on a 5-point sliding scale from Liberal to Conservative and to type in their 
age. 
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At the end of the survey, participants were asked to identify what NGRI stood for. This 
served as a criterion for inclusion, because not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) is the focus of 





All analyses for gender were run with two groups, because the “other” category only had 
two participants. Additionally, self-identified race was condensed into two groups; because over 
half of the participants identified as European-American they were divided into European 
Americans and Non-European Americans. Further, participants were asked their political leaning 
on a sliding scale; liberal and conservative extremes were uneven groups, so for more even 
groups to use in comparison the liberal and moderate liberals were combined into one group, 
while the conservatives and moderate conservatives were also put into a single group. The 
moderate group was kept as is. Lastly, participants were all above the age of 18, but there were 
many more on the younger end. Participants were divided into three age groups: 18 through 29-
year-olds, 30-39-year-olds, and participants aged 40 and up. Table 1 contains the number of 
participants in each group.  Chi-square analyses were run to determine if the number of male 
versus female participants differed by political group or by race, as well as if the participants 
from different racial groups differed by political affiliation. All Chi-square significance levels 
were above .05. This allows for the assumption of independence between the variables in further 
analyses.  
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Additionally, Chi-square tests were run to determine the independence of the 
demographic variables that were measured with the pretrial attitude towards the insanity defense 
groupings. All of the results were significant, p<0.001, except for gender, p = 0.142. This means 
that all the demographic variable groups (except for gender) were dependent on the pretrial 
attitude groups, which means that the groups are associated. While ANOVAs could be run with 
attitude groups and demographic variables, there are not equal numbers of participants when 
divided across both variables and the groups would be too uneven to determine where the source 
of variation. 
In addition to organizing participants into the demographic groupings just mentioned, 
participants’ general pretrial attitude towards the insanity defense was used to organize them into 
three groups extreme high, middle, and low groups (which consist of the top 25%, middle 50%, 
and lower 25%, respectively), Using extreme groups was done in order to more clearly measure 
the differences that result from people holding differing attitudes prior to receiving any case 
information. Further, I am running many analyses in this section, so in order to address the 
family-wise error problem, I am adopting a significance level of .01 for all of my analyses.  
I ran mixed model two factor ANOVA tests to determine if the attitudes held by 
participants prior to receiving any case information influenced their decision-making regarding 
case evidence. These tests compared attitude groups (Low Support, Mid Support, and High 
Support for the insanity defense) across ratings that followed each of the seven pieces of case 
evidence.  The assumption of sphericity was violated for both ANOVAs, thus Greenhouse-
Geisser statistics are reported for all the ANOVA based analyses. The first ANOVA was run on 
the not guilty by reason of insanity measure, and the second was run on the ratings of the 
defendant’s responsibility. 
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For not guilty by reason of insanity ratings for pieces of evidence, the overall effect of 
pretrial attitude groups was significant, F(2, 487) = 46.68, MSE = 4.02, p < .001.  Not 
surprisingly, participants with low pre-trial support for the insanity defense were the least likely 
to say they would give the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity compared to the mid and 
high support groups. The interaction between pre-trial attitudes and the type of case evidence 
also had a significant effect on participants’ not guilty by reasons of insanity ratings, F(6.26, 
1524.84) = 18.75, MSE = 1.81, p < .001.  (see Figure 1). 
Additionally, the overall effect of pretrial attitude groups on perceived responsibility was 
significant, F(2, 487) = 37.42, MSE = 4.42, p < .001. Moreover, pretrial attitudes interacted with 
the piece of case information F(9.03, 2197.86) = 15.15, MSE = 0.88, p < .001.  (See Figure 2). 
To further understand the nature of the significant interactions, planned comparison t-
tests were run between pretrial attitude groups across each type of evidence.  Appendix C 
contains the t-values for these comparisons. For these comparisons, I used equal variances 
assumed unless the variance of one of the samples was more than twice the variance of the other 
sample, it is noted in Appendix C where values for equal variances not assumed had to be used. 
First the low support for the insanity defense group was compared to the mid support group 
across the not guilty by reason of insanity ratings for each piece of evidence. For each piece of 
evidence introduced after the baseline measure, the low support group was less likely to give the 
defendant not guilty by reason of insanity than the mid support group and rated the defendant as 
more responsible across all types of evidence (all p’s ≤ .001). The same effect was seen for 
responsibility ratings, where the low support group rated the defendant as significantly more 
responsible than the mid support group across all pieces of evidence (all p’s ≤ .001). 
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Following this, the mid support group was compared to the high support group for not 
guilty by reason of insanity ratings for the first three pieces of case evidence after the baseline 
(mother hospitalized, childhood abuse, defendant experiences delusions) did not significantly 
differ from each other (all p’s > .01).  For the last three pieces of case evidence (schizophrenia 
evaluation, substance abuse, brain scans), the high support group was significantly more likely to 
give not guilty by reason of insanity than the mid support group (all p’s < .001). Next, the mid 
and high support groups were compared across perceived responsibility ratings. Ratings after the 
mother’s hospitalization and childhood history of abuse were not significantly different between 
the groups (p > .01). For the evidence from the defendant’s self- testimony to delusions and all 
subsequent evidence (schizophrenia diagnosis, substance abuse, and brain scans), the high 
support group rated the defendant as less responsible than the mid support group (all p’s < .01). 
Lastly, the low support and high support groups were compared. For their ratings on not 
guilty by reason of insanity, the high support group was significantly more likely to give the 
defendant not guilty by reason of insanity across all pieces of evidence (all p’s < .001). Finally, 
the low and high support groups were compared on their ratings for perceived responsibility; the 
low support group rated the defendant as significantly more responsible than the high support 
group after all pieces of evidence (all p’s < .01), with the exception of the ratings following the 
defendant's mother being hospitalized for schizophrenia, where they did not significantly differ 
(p = .022). 
A final set of analyses compared demographic groups’ ratings. The first ANOVA was run 
comparing Europeans and Non-Europeans on their not guilty by reason of insanity ratings, there 
was a statistically significant difference between race groups, F(2,487) = 4.62, MSE = 4.71, p = 
.01. Further, the interaction between the piece of case evidence and race groups was also 
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significant, F(6.18, 1505.57) = 3.10, MSE = 1.95, p = .005. European participants were less 
likely to give the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity than Non-European participants, and 
they were less likely to say that they would give the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity 
after most pieces of evidence, with the exception of the ratings for the first and last pieces of 
evidence where they were almost equally likely to give not guilty by reason of insanity (see 
Figure 3). 
After this, an ANOVA was run comparing race across the pieces of evidence for 
responsibility ratings. The main effect of race was not significant (p=.04). However, the 
interaction between evidence and race was significant, F(4.24, 2068.44) = 4.03, MSE = 0.98, p = 
.002. This means that while responsibility ratings did not differ as a function of race, they did 
differ across pieces of evidence. The ratings also differed across pieces of evidence as a function 
of race groups. Overall European participants rated the defendant as more responsible than the 
Non-Europeans for the first several pieces of evidence (baseline, mother with schizophrenia, 
defendant abused), and for the last several pieces of evidence (defendant diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, substance abuse, brain scans) both groups ratings were nearly the same (see 
Figure 4).  
Following this, an ANOVA was run comparing political groups across the pieces of 
evidence for not guilty by reason of insanity ratings. There was not a statistically significant 
difference between political groups (p = .36). The interaction between political affiliation and 
type of evidence was not significant (p = .71). This shows that participants of different political 
affiliations did not differ in their likelihood of saying they would give the defendant not guilty by 
reason of insanity. This means that while participants’ ratings differed across different pieces of 
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evidence, they did not differ significantly as a function of political affiliation. Further, political 
affiliation did not appear to affect differences in participants’ ratings across pieces of evidence. 
Then an ANOVA was run comparing political groups across pieces of evidence for 
responsibility ratings. There was not a significant difference between political groups for ratings 
(p=.29). However, the interaction between political group and evidence type was significant, 
F(8.46, 1953.15) = 6.78, MSE = 0.96, p < .001. This means that while ratings did not 
significantly differ between political groups, they did differ across pieces of evidence. Further, 
ratings across pieces of evidence differed as a function of political group, where overall it 
appears that liberals and moderate liberals were most influenced by each piece of information, 
beginning with the highest responsibility ratings at the baseline measure and ending with the 
lowest responsibility ratings after the last piece of evidence (brain scans) was presented (see 
Figure 5). Further, conservatives and moderate conservatives’ ratings stayed more consistent 
compared to moderates as well as liberals and moderate liberals (see Figure 5). 
Age groups were compared across the seven pieces of case evidence and participants’ 
ratings were significantly different across age groups, F(1, 488) = 12.10, MSE = 4.67, p = .001. 
The interaction between age group and piece of case evidence was also significant, F(3.06, 
1493.93) = 7.90, MSE = 1.96, p < .001. This shows that participants who were part of different 
age groups tended to have different likelihoods of giving the defendant not guilty by reason of 
insanity. Further, the youngest age group (18-29) was overall the most likely to say that they 
would give not guilty by reason of insanity compared to participants who were 30 years old and 
up (see Figure 6). 
Next age groups were compared across types of evidence for their responsibility ratings. 
Here, neither the main effect of age group (p=.03) nor the interaction (p=.56) were significant. 
PRETRIAL	  ATTITUDES’	  INFLUENCE	  ON	  JUROR	  DECISIONS	  	  
18	  
	  
This means that while the responsibility ratings did differ across type of evidence, they did not 
differ by age group, nor did the ratings differ across type of evidence as a function of age group. 
Lastly, gender was compared across the seven pieces of case evidence for not guilty by 
reason of insanity ratings, and participants’ ratings did not differ by gender (p=.17), and the 
interaction between gender and type of evidence was also not significant (p=.05). This means 
that while ratings did differ across the piece of evidence, ratings did not differ as a function of 
gender nor did gender impact how participants rated each piece of case evidence. 
Then an ANOVA was run comparing gender across types of evidence for responsibility 
ratings. Neither the main effect of gender (p=.09) nor the interaction between type of evidence 
and gender (p=.40) were significant. This means that while responsibility ratings did differ 
across pieces of evidence, they did not differ based on gender nor did they differ across pieces of 
evidence as a function of gender. 
Because the defendant’s and victim’s races were not specified in the study, the 
participants were asked the perceived race of both the defendant and victim towards the end of 
the study. The majority of the participants (83.5%) said that the victim was white, and 16.5% 
said he was non-white. More participants thought the victim was non-white than the defendant, 
with 66.1% who thought that the victim was white and 33.9% who thought he was non-white. 
 
Discussion 
Similar to previous studies (Axer, et al., 2010, Kardis, 2015, Skeem & Golding, 2001, the 
present study demonstrated that mock jurors’ pre-existing attitudes towards the insanity defense 
did in fact influence their ratings for both their likelihood of giving the defendant not guilty by 
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reason of insanity as well as their perceived responsibility. The present study is intended to be 
exploratory research that highlights how pretrial beliefs and attitudes influence mock jurors’ 
interpretation of case information and their sentencing decisions regarding defendants who are 
pleading not guilty by reason of insanity. In addition to looking at how pretrial attitudes affect 
decisions about case information, this study also presents the mock jurors with six pieces of 
evidence after the initial case vignette to see how different types of information impact 
sentencing decisions. These pieces of evidence are presented to every participant in a fixed order, 
beginning with the circumstantial evidence and ending with brain scans, which is known to be 
very convincing for jurors (Greene and Cahill 2012) and must be presented as supporting other 
evidence due to the fact that “neuroimaging findings are not specific enough to inform questions 
of volitional and cognitive impairment,” (Greene and Cahill 2012). 
 For not guilty by reason of insanity ratings, mock jurors who had low pre-trial support for 
the insanity defense were significantly less likely to give the defendant not guilty by reason of 
insanity than both mock jurors who had mid and high pre-trial support for the insanity defense. 
Mock jurors who had mid pre-trial support for the insanity defense did not differ from those who 
had high pre-trial support for the first three pieces of case evidence (mother hospitalized, 
defendant abused, defendant experienced delusions), but across the last three pieces of case 
evidence (diagnosed with schizophrenia, substance abuse, brain scans), mock jurors who had 
higher pretrial support for the insanity defense said that they were significantly more likely to 
give the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity than mock jurors who had mid pretrial 
support. 
Mock jurors who had low pretrial support for the insanity defense tended to have the 
most consistent ratings for not guilty by reason of insanity across all pieces of case evidence. On 
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the other hand, those with high pretrial support was less consistent across their not guilty by 
reason of insanity ratings. This consistency amongst those with lower pretrial support shows that 
those with low pretrial support for the insanity defense tended to maintain their initial view and 
were less influenced by each piece of evidence presented than those with higher pretrial support. 
The perceived responsibility ratings also differed significantly based on mock jurors’ 
pretrial support for the insanity defense. Similar to not guilty by reason of insanity ratings, mock 
jurors who had low pretrial support for the insanity defense rated the defendant as more 
responsible than mock jurors who had mid or high pretrial support for the insanity defense. The 
only exception to this was that jurors with low and high pretrial support for the insanity defense 
did not differ on their responsibility ratings following the piece of case evidence where the 
defendant’s mother was hospitalized for schizophrenia. Mock jurors who had mid pretrial 
support for the insanity defense, compared to those with high pretrial support, did not differ in 
their responsibility ratings for the first two pieces of case evidence (mother hospitalized for 
schizophrenia, childhood history of abuse), but mock jurors with high pretrial support rated the 
defendant as significantly less responsible than the mid support group rated him. 
Overall, across perceived responsibility ratings, mock jurors’ perceived responsibility 
ratings went down as they received more case evidence. While mock jurors’ responsibility 
ratings general decreased across pieces of evidence, there was a similar trend with not guilty by 
reason of insanity ratings. This trend shows that mock jurors who had low pretrial support for the 
insanity defense tended to be the least influenced by each additional piece of case evidence, 
whereas those with higher pretrial support for the insanity defense tended to be more influenced 
by each piece of evidence. This resulted in mock jurors with low pretrial support maintaining 
higher responsibility ratings, while those who had higher pretrial support had responsibility 
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ratings that got increasingly lower compared to mock jurors with low and mid pretrial support 
for the insanity defense. 
In addition, the present research looked at how each piece of case information influenced 
jurors’ decision-making, and how this compared to the expected effect of each piece of evidence 
of mock jurors’ rating decisions. The first piece of case evidence that is introduced after the case 
vignette is the fact that the defendant has a known family history of mental illness and his mother 
was hospitalized for schizophrenia. Schizophrenia which has heritability approaching 50%, thus 
there is a particularly high chance of the defendant inheriting it. Given the case vignette and this 
evidence, mock jurors were less likely to give the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity than 
they were after just the case vignette. Overall mock jurors also rated the defendant as fairly 
responsible for his actions, but less responsible than after just the case vignette. While I did not 
expect jurors to be less likely to give the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity as compared 
to the baseline case vignette, the decreased level of perceived responsibility is in-line with what 
was expected after learning about family history of schizophrenia. This could be a result of any 
additional case information being offered, however, that is something that would be good for 
future research on this topic to address. 
Next the mock jurors learned that the defendant suffered childhood abuse, which 
introduced higher risk of an individual developing mental illness. This is particularly relevant 
due to the defendant’s family history of schizophrenia. While mock jurors’ not guilty by reason 
of insanity ratings stayed the same as compared to the prior rating, mock jurors rated the 
defendant as more responsible after learning that he was abused as a child. This increased 
perceived responsibility is counter to my expectation of decreased perceived responsibility due to 
the combination of childhood abuse increasing likelihood of developing mental illness paired 
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with the defendant’s family history of schizophrenia. This does, however, have important 
implications for those who have experienced childhood abuse and that they should be cautious if 
revealing this information in insanity defense cases. 
Following this, the defendant testified to experiencing delusions, which could be 
interpreted differently based on subjective prototypes of insanity. Overall mock jurors were more 
likely to give the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity as compared to the previous ratings. 
Most mock jurors rated the defendant as less responsible after he testified to experiencing 
delusions, with the exception of those who had low pretrial support for the insanity defense 
whose ratings stayed just about the same from the prior rating. Because this piece of evidence is 
the first piece of evidence that could explicitly and directly support the defendant’s own mental 
illness, it was not surprising (and reassuring) to find that mock jurors said that they were more 
likely to give the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity as well as decreased perceived 
responsibility. 
Then mock jurors were presented with a psychological evaluation that revealed the 
defendant had schizophrenia. As expected every group was more likely to give the defendant not 
guilty by reason of insanity and rated the defendant as less responsible as compared to the 
previous ratings. Following the evaluation, it was revealed that the defendant also had comorbid 
substance abuse. Past research has shown substance abuse problems to be treated more harshly 
than other mental disorders in the context of insanity defense cases. This is exactly what was 
found in this research, in which mock jurors both decreased their likelihood of giving not guilty 
by reason of insanity as well as rated the defendant as more responsible as compared to the 
previous set of ratings. 
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The last piece of case evidence that mock jurors are given is fMRI brain scans that 
supported a schizophrenia diagnosis. This was very convincing for mock jurors overall, and they 
said that they were more likely to give the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity as well as 
rated the defendant as less guilty compared to the previous ratings. While brain scans are 
convincing evidence, however, they can only be used in court in conjunction with other evidence 
of mental illness, since they are correlational and can only be used to support a diagnosis rather 
than to serve as a diagnosis for the defendant. Overall, there was a moderate to large effect of 
evidence type, which highlights the importance of looking at the influence of different types of 
evidence in insanity defense cases – different evidence will sway different jurors towards 
different sentencing decisions so it is important to consider the impact of each piece of evidence 
being offered to a jury. Further, overall the interaction between evidence and pretrial attitudes 
was a small effect, but still had significant differences between groups.  
Demographic factors also influenced sentencing decisions. European mock jurors were 
less likely to give not guilty by reason of insanity than Non-European mock jurors, and whether 
mock jurors identified as European and Non-European Americans had an effect of how each 
piece of case information was rated. Similarly, for responsibility ratings, while race was not 
significant, race did influence the responsibility ratings across type of information and European 
mock jurors perceived the defendant as being more responsible than Non-European mock jurors 
for the first several pieces of evidence (baseline, mother with schizophrenia, defendant abused). 
Surprisingly, political affiliation did not have a significant impact on not guilty by reason of 
insanity ratings, nor did political affiliation interact with the type of evidence which means that 
mock jurors with different political affiliations did not interpret case evidence differently. 
Responsibility ratings also did not differ based on political affiliation, however, the interaction 
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with political affiliation and type of evidence was significant. This means that political affiliation 
influenced mock jurors’ responsibility ratings across types of evidence; liberals appear to be 
most influenced by different pieces of evidence and their perceived responsibility decreases 
across new pieces of evidence, whereas conservatives’ ratings stayed relatively consistent across 
all pieces of evidence.  
Next, not guilty by reason of insanity ratings differed by age group as well as by group 
across the different types of evidence, where younger mock jurors (18-29) were more likely than 
jurors over 30 to give the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity. For the responsibility 
ratings, mock jurors’ ratings did not differ by age group nor did they differ by age group across 
the type of evidence. Lastly, not guilty by reason of insanity ratings did not differ by gender or 
by gender across different types of information. This was also the case for responsibility ratings 
by gender, meaning that the gender of the mock juror had no effect on ratings or how evidence 
was interpreted for not guilty by reason of insanity or for responsibility. 
In insanity defense cases, it is expected that jurors are objective in making sentencing 
decisions, however there are many factors that influence sentencing decisions and how jurors 
interpret each piece of case evidence. The present research show that pretrial attitudes towards 
the insanity defense had a significant impact on both how likely mock jurors said they were to 
give the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity as well as how responsible they perceived the 
defendant to be for his actions. Mock jurors who had lower pretrial support for the insanity 
defense were less likely to give the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity and to see the 
defendant as more responsible than mock jurors who had higher pretrial support. Further, these 
pretrial attitudes affected how influenced the mock jurors were by each piece of evidence, with 
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those who had higher pretrial support being the most influenced by each piece of evidence and 
those with lower pretrial support being the least influenced by each piece of evidence. 
Because the present study was intended as exploratory research it has certain limitations. 
One of these limitations is a result of multiple comparisons and having run a large number of 
tests run. Since this research is intended as an exploratory basis for future research, future 
research can use the findings from this study as a basis to narrow down what comparisons need 
to be run in future studies in order to avoid this. The purpose of this was to determine exactly 
where differences occurred between different levels of pretrial support for the insanity defense 
and across different types of evidence. Most past research has not looked specifically at levels of 
pretrial support in conjunction with different types of evidence, so this research served to look at 
how these differing levels of support interacted with different types of evidence. Further, the 
order in which the pieces of evidence were presented after the baseline case vignette was 
controlled in this study, because many pieces of evidence influence or build on each other, so 
each rating considers the current piece of evidence as well as all preceding pieces of evidence. 
Another limitation of this study is in the use of the word “heritability” when discussing 
schizophrenia, given that it is likely not everyone understands what heritability is in this context, 
and in future research perhaps a more accessible word can be used to ensure uniform 
understanding of the piece of evidence.  
Controlling for the order for pieces of evidence in this study allowed for knowing that 
each rating was based on that piece of evidence in conjunction with all preceding evidence. 
Additionally, brain scans are not always included court testimony because they are correlational 
evidence that must be presented in conjunction with other diagnostic evidence, such as a 
psychological evaluation. Brain scans were also presented as the last piece of evidence, because 
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they are known to be one of the most convincing forms of evidence, even though they are 
correlational evidence (Gurley and Marcus, 2008). For future research, it would be good to look 
at the influence of different types of evidence without controlling for order as this study did. This 
would allow for looking at types of evidence more independently, however, it is important to 
keep in mind the influence of order and how different pieces of evidence support each other, as 
well as the fact that some evidence (ex. brain scans) might not be admissible in court on its own. 
The relationship of different pieces of evidence to one another is important, because once 
evidence is presented in court it cannot be unseen by jurors, thus order is a critical aspect of how 
evidence is presented to and interpreted by a jury.    
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NGRI Ratings by Demographics Across Types of Evidence 











Male 3.54 (1.30) 2.64 (1.70) 2.60 (1.17) 2.92 (1.24) 3.29 (1.21) 2.91 (1.28) 3.26 (1.24) 
Female 3.36 (1.30) 2.56 (1.17) 2.51 (1.20) 2.91 (1.23) 3.28 (1.24) 2.83 (1.36) 3.25 (1.32) 
European 3.51 (1.34) 2.35 (1.10) 2.32 (1.12) 2.74 (1.23) 3.22 (1.26) 2.77 (1.32 3.26 (1.33) 




3.47 (1.35) 2.58 (1.18) 2.52 (1.20) 3.03 (1.25) 3.41 (1.21) 2.95 (1.33) 3.45 (1.29) 















Responsibility Ratings by Demographics Across Types of Evidence 











Male 4.19 (0.98) 3.56 (1.14) 3.80 (1.11) 3.62 (1.12) 3.20 (1.21) 3.50 (1.21) 3.13 (1.23) 
Female 4.25 (0.94) 3.57 (1.20) 4.00 (1.02) 3.71 (1.12) 3.38 (1.25) 3.67 (1.23) 3.34 (1.28) 
European 4.37 (0.88) 3.70 (1.16) 3.99 (1.06) 3.72 (1.14) 3.30 (1.27) 3.63 (1.23) 3.19 (1.32) 




4.34 (0.88) 3.60 (1.20) 3.97 (1.05) 3.55 (1.18) 3.05 (1.29) 3.45 (1.30) 3.00 (1.29) 




4.09 (1.11) 3.49 (1.22) 3.81 (1.15) 3.76 (1.17) 3.55 (1.19) 3.69 (1.22) 3.29 (1.24) 
 
  





Figure	  1.	  NGRI	  Ratings	  by	  Attitude	  Groups	  Across	  Types	  of	  Evidence	  
 





















































Figure	  2.	  Responsiblity	  Ratings	  by	  Attitude	  Groups	  Across	  Types	  of	  Evidence	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Figure	  3.	  NGRI	  Ratings	  by	  Race	  Groups	  Across	  Types	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  Evidence 
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Figure	  6.	  NGRI	  Ratings	  by	  Age	  Groups	  Across	  Types	  of	  Evidence	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This is the baseline measure case vignette that the participants are presented with: “Mr. Johnson 
is a male who is standing trial for manslaughter. The victim, Mr. Wilson, was graffitiing a 
wall when Mr. Johnson came across him. Offended by the content of Mr. Wilson’s graffiti, Mr. 
Johnson proceeded to argue with, then subsequently attack, Mr. Wilson. As a result of this 
attack, Mr. Wilson was killed and Mr. Johnson accused of manslaughter. Mr. Johnson claims 
that at the time of the crime he did not understand the wrongfulness of his actions and is pleading 
not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). If given NGRI, Mr. Johnson would be found not guilty 
on the basis of a mental disorder which made him unable to determine right from wrong at the 
time of the crime or that he had an irresistible impulse that he was unable to control. This would 
result in him being detained in a psychiatric care facility instead of prison.” 
  





This appendix includes all pieces of case evidence that the participants were provided with after 
the baseline case vignette: 
 
1. “Mr. Johnson’s mother was hospitalized during Mr. Johnson’s childhood for 
schizophrenia. Therefore, Mr. Johnson is known to have a family history of mental illness 
(specifically, schizophrenia is known to have high heritability).” 
2. “Mr. Johnson’s experienced physical abuse from his mother growing up.” 
3. “Mr. Johnson testified that he suffers from delusions and hallucinations which he is 
unable to control.” 
4. “A psychological evaluation was conducted by an expert witness who verified that Mr. 
Johnson suffers from schizophrenia, which could have rendered him incapable of 
controlling his actions at the time the crime was committed.” 
5. “The psychological evaluation also revealed that Mr. Johnson suffers from a substance 
abuse disorder, which was present at the time of the crime.” 
6. “Brain scans were provided that showed abnormalities in Mr. Johnson’s temporal lobe 
and enlarged ventricles, which is often seen in studies of patients with schizophrenia.” 




Table A1: Insanity defense pretrial attitude groups compared: low support to mid support 
 T-value df 
NGRI baseline 2.73 246.43 
NGRI Mom hospitalized -6.89** 366.00 
NGRI childhood abuse -6.94** 366.99 
NGRI Delusion self-testimony -6.07** 336.00 
NGRI Psych eval for schizophrenia -5.64** 234.82 
NGRI Substance abuse -5.51** 366.00 
NGRI brain scans -5.55** 366.00 
Responsibility baseline † 6.29** 366.00 
Responsibility Mom hospitalized 3.42** 366.00 
Responsibility childhood abuse 4.26** 366.00 
Responsibility Delusion self-testimony 4.66** 366.00 
Responsibility Psych eval for schizophrenia † 4.17** 366.00 
Responsibility Substance abuse 4.64** 366.00 
Responsibility brain scans 4.34** 366.00 
** p ≤ .001.  * p < .01. 
† equal variances not assumed 
 
Table A2: Insanity defense pretrial attitude groups compared: mid support to high support 
 T-value df 
NGRI baseline † -0.77 227.18 
NGRI Mom hospitalized 1.67 352.00 
NGRI childhood abuse 1.77 352.00 
NGRI Delusion self-testimony -1.91 352.00 
NGRI Psych eval for schizophrenia -5.29** 352.00 
NGRI Substance abuse -3.961** 352.00 
NGRI brain scans -6.85** 352.00 
Responsibility baseline † -2.98* 352.00 
Responsibility Mom hospitalized -0.55 352.00 
Responsibility childhood abuse 0.15 352.00 
Responsibility Delusion self-testimony 2.75* 209.29 
Responsibility Psych eval for schizophrenia † 6.10** 214.05 
Responsibility Substance abuse 4.58** 200.00 
Responsibility brain scans 7.10** 352.00 
** p ≤ .001.  * p < .01. 
† equal variances not assumed 
 
Table A3: Insanity defense pretrial attitude groups compared: low support to high support 
 T-value df 
NGRI baseline † 1.67 255.72 
NGRI Mom hospitalized -4.35** 256.00 
NGRI childhood abuse -4.39** 256.00 
NGRI Delusion self-testimony -6.59** 256.00 
NGRI Psych eval for schizophrenia † -9.27** 252.21 
NGRI Substance abuse -7.85** 256.00 
NGRI brain scans † -10.44** 255.62 
Responsibility baseline 2.97* 256.00 
Responsibility Mom hospitalized 2.312** 256.00 
Responsibility childhood abuse 3.54** 256.00 
Responsibility Delusion self-testimony 6.13** 256.00 
Responsibility Psych eval for schizophrenia 8.50** 256.00 
Responsibility Substance abuse 7.64** 256.00 
Responsibility brain scans 9.19** 256.00 
** p ≤ .001.  * p < .01. 
† equal variances not assumed 
